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place in mid-century, questions of meaning were deemed to be logically prior to 80 questions of truth and questions of metaphysics were linked to questions of method.
81
The debate about the unity or heterogeneity of the sciences was not a debate about action/event distinction that dominated the discussion in the mid-century.
95
The Golden Age of the Philosophy of History
96
The 1960s were a golden age for the philosophy of history. between the human and natural sciences must be a distinction in kind, not in degree.
138
It is indeed a distinction in kind because the distinction between the natural and 139 human sciences is a distinction between normative and descriptive sciences, not a 140 distinction between exact and inexact sciences, as Mill claimed.
141
This golden age of the philosophy of history was dominated by a non-reductivist 142 consensus which came to be epitomised by the slogan "reasons are not causes".
143
During this period to be a non-reductivist was to be a non-causalist and to be a 9 The normativity at work in rational explanation is not specifically moral since there is no need to assume the agent whose action one is trying to understand acts from morally praiseworthy principles; rational explanation is nonetheless a species of justification since a chain of reasoning must be deductively valid in order for the behaviour which expresses it to count as an action. The original publication is available at www. 
domains of enquiry to that of accommodating folk-psychological explanations 329 within the conception of reality that dominates the natural sciences.
330
In the latter half of the century the convergence of a renewed interest in ontology 
347
In the early 1960s the philosophy of action had yet to be recognised as a 348 distinctive area of philosophy. As we have seen, the action/event distinction was The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
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